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1.   Introduct i on
Ther e has been vi ol ent  pol i t i cal  confl i ct  i n No r t hern I r eland f or  over  30 years ( 1969-
2001),  ma k i ng t he Troubl es one of the l ongest -runni ng l ow-i nt ensit y confl i cts i n t he 
Wo r l d.   Ov e r   t he l ast  30 years t here has been subst anti al  vari ati on i n t he m agni t ude of 
t he confl i ct,  as m easured by,  for exam ple, t he t ot al num ber of pol i t i call y related 
deaths and i nj uri es i n t he Pr ovi nce.  Si nce t he 1998 G ood Fr i day Ag r eem ent  t here has 
been som e r educt i on i n t he i nt ensit y of  t he confl i ct,   prom pt i ng speculati on about   t he 
pot enti al  size of  a No r t hern  I r i sh "peace di vi dend" .
Gi ven t he l engt h of  t he confl i ct,   and t he r elati ve abundance of  econom i c dat a 
f or No r t hern Ir eland,  there have been surpri singl y few  quant i t ati ve st udi es on t he 
i m pact of pol i t i cal vi ol ence on econom i c acti vi t y,  and (t o our know l edge) no
econom et r i c wo r k  of  any  ki nd.   Exi sti ng  esti ma t es of  t he  size of  t he  peace di vi dend  are 
t herefore highl y speculati ve.  In t hi s paper we  wi l l  pl ug a gap i n t he l i t erature by 
di r ectl y est i ma t i ng el asti cit i es of m anufacturi ng i nvest me n t  and em pl oym ent  wi t h
r espect  t o t he i nt ensi t y  of  t he  confl i ct.   Al t hough  t hi s i s not   by  i t self   enough  t o  esti ma t e 
t he pot enti al econom i c consequences of the peace (wh i ch depend al so on act i vi t y i n 
t he subst anti al  publ i c and pri vat e servi ce sectors),   i t   i s surely an essenti al  com ponent 
i n  t he  calcul ati on.
Ou r  result s are also relevant to a second i ssue. Econom i c acti vi t y (i ncl udi ng 
m anufacturi ng act i vi t y) in N ort hern Ir eland has received very generous i nvest me n t  
and em pl oym ent  subsi di es over the past  three decades. A g r eat deal of att enti on has 
been pai d t o t hi s system ,  and t o i t s r eform  ( see f or  exam ple Cl ul ow  and Teague,   1993;  
Ha r t ,  1993;  Ha mi l t on,  1996).  On e  i m port ant factor in det ermi ni ng an econom i call y 
eff i cient  set  of  subsi di es wi l l   be  t he  extent  t o  wh i ch t he  confl i ct  has  l ed t o  r educt i ons  i n
di f f erent  f actor  i nput s.  It  wi l l   be i m port ant  t o know  wh i ch t ypes of  i nput   are t he wo r st 
aff ected by  t he  vi ol ence,  and  t herefore t he  ones  mo s t   deservi ng  subsi di es on  econom i c 
grounds.   Ou r   paper  wi l l   provi de  som e evidence  r elevant  t o  t hi s i ssue by  esti ma t i ng  t he 
extent  t o  wh i ch t he  i m pact  of  vi ol ence vari es across di f f erent  f actors of  product i on.
The  next   secti on provi des an overvi ew  of  t he No r t hern I r i sh econom y duri ng 
t he  peri od  of  t he  confl i ct.   Thi s i nforms   t he  econom et r i c m odel   presented i n  Secti on  3.
Secti on  4  concl udes.3
2.   Econom i c Perform ance i n  No r t hern Ireland
S u mma r y stati sti cs f or  t he No r t hern I r eland econom y present  a mi xed pi cture.  On   t he 
one hand,  the rate of grow t h of real GDP f or recent years has out str i pped t h e  UK 
average.  The  average annual   grow t h  r ate f or  No r t hern  I r eland  over  1985-94  wa s   3. 4% ,  
as com pared w it h 2. 4%  for the U K  as a w hol e. For  the m anufacturi ng sect or the 
cont r ast is even greater,  wi t h fi gures of 7. 5%  and 1. 3% .
1 Ho we v e r ,  the l evel  of per
capi t a  GDP i n N ort hern Ir eland i s sti l l  onl y 80%  of the U K  average (Bi r ni e and 
Hi t chens,  1999).   Hi t chens et  al .   ( 1993)  argue t hat   t he r ate of  convergence i mp l i cit   i n 
such fi gures is low er than t he average int ernat i onal  convergence rates esti ma t ed in 
cross-count r y  grow t h  m odel s.  I n  ot her  wo r ds,   No r t hern  I r eland  i s not   catching  up  wi t h 
Br i t ain as qui ckly as one m i ght  expect.  The under -perf orm ance of the N ort hern 
I r eland  econom y  mi ght   be  due  t o  a vari ety  of  proxi ma t e causes:
1. Fact or i nput s .   The  No r t hern I r eland unem pl oym ent   r ate ( 13. 0%  i n 1995)  has 
been persistentl y hi gher than t he U K  average (8. 8%  i n 1995).  On  t he ot her 
hand several studi es indi cate that  No r t hern Ir eland m anufacturi ng i nvest me n t  
r ates are no l ow er  t han t he UK  average ( Ha r r i s,  1983;   He n r y,   1989;   Hi t chens 
et al . ,  1990;  Hi t chens and B ir ni e, 1993,  1994),  and t hat  they have at  ti me s  
been higher.  Thi s expl ains t he fact that  there has been som e convergence,  
how ever li mi t ed. But  the N ort hern Ir i sh econom y has becom e i ncreasingl y 
m anufacturi ng i nt ensive – as i ndi cated by t he grow t h r at es above – wh i l e t he 
Br i t i sh econom y t hat   has becom e l ess m anufacturi ng i nt ensive.   So  ma r gi nal l y 
hi gher  m anufacturi ng i nvest me n t   r ates i n t he provi nce do not   r epresent  bet t er 
underl yi ng  econom i c perf orm ance.
2. Fact or product i vit y. Hi stori call y,  No r t hern Ir el and product i vi t y grow t h,  at 
l east  i n  t he  m anufacturi ng  sector,   has  been l ow er  t han  t he  UK  average.  Fi gures 
r eport ed in Borooah and Lee (1991) and Borooah (1993) imp l y t hat  average 
annual  TFP gr ow t h i n N ort hern Ir eland over 1960-83 w as 2. 0% ,  com pared 
wi t h2 . 1%  for t he w hol e  UK.  The di spari t y i s even larger f or f actors of
product i on consi dered indi vi dual l y.  Av e r age annual  grow t h i n N ort hern
I r eland l abour product i vi t y w as 2. 9% ,  com pared w it h 3. 2%  for th e  UK;  for 
capit al  product i vi t y t he f i gures are –3. 2%  and 1. 1% .   These di f f erenti als have 
r esult ed i n l ow er  l evels   of  product i vi t y  i n  t he  l ate 1980s  and  1990s.   Bi r ni e and 
1  Fi gures  are  based  on  Br adley  and  Mc C a r t an  ( 1998).4
Hi t chens (1999) esti ma t e that  No r t hern Ir eland m anufacturi ng l abour
product i vi t y  i n  1987  wa s   77%   t hat   of  t he  UK  as a w hol e.  I n  no  sub-sector  wa s
product i vi t y hi gher  i n t he provi nce t han i n Br i t ain.
To  s u mma r i se:  em ploym ent   perf orm ance and l abour  product i vi t y i n No r t hern I r eland 
are wo r se t han i n Br i t ain;   i nvest me n t   i s not   mu c h   hi gher,   and capit al  product i vi t y i s 
l ow er. Per capit a  GDP i n t he provi nce is low er than t he U K  average, and i s not  
convergi ng on t hi s average very qui ckly.  These styl i sed facts suggest  that  No r t hern 
I r eland f aces an aggregate product i on f unct i on ( and hence l abour  and capit al  dem and 
curves)  t hat   l i es bel ow  Br i t ain’s.
To what  ext ent can thi s be expl ained by t he Troubl es? R ow thorn (1981) 
suggest s t hat   t he confl i ct  mi ght   r educe f actor  product i vi t y,   and t herefore em ploym ent  
and i nvest me n t ,  by degradati on of the capit al stock i n at t acks on propert y.  Per haps 
mo r e im port antl y,  t he vi ol ence could al so reduce invest me n t  ( and eventual l y
em ploym ent )   t hrough i ncreased uncert aint y about   t he r eturns t o i nvest i ng i n No r t hern 
I r i sh indust r y.  As  t he i nt ensit y of confl i ct increases the perceived probabi l i t y of a 
ma j or escalati on of vi ol ence, in whi ch product i on i s severely di srupt ed, mi ght  also 
i ncrease. If  it  is im possibl e to i nsure against  such ri sks ful l y,  or if  there is invest me n t  
hyst eresis (Di xi t  and Pi ndyck,  1994),  t hen fi r ms  wi l l  be m ore cauti ous i n t hei r
i nvest me n t   decisions.
The  size of t hi s eff ect coul d have been exacerbat ed by t he fact that  a large 
num ber  of  pl ants i n  No r t hern  I r eland  i n  t he  1970s  we r e part   of  f i r ms   based  out side  t he 
provi nce ( mo s t l y i n Br i t ain).   Ha mi l t on ( 1993)  poi nt s out   t hat   t he num ber  of  Br i t i sh-
ow ned pl ants in N ort hern Ir eland fell  fr om  290 i n 1973 t o 121 i n 1990.  The f all  in 
em ploym ent  corr espondi ng t o t he net  reduct i on i n t he num ber of such plants w as 
41, 186.   A  f urt her  5, 290 j obs we r e l ost   as t he r esult   of  t he closure of  pl ants ow ned by 
f i r m s based out side t h e  UK.  Fot hergi l l  and G uy (1990) argue t hat  Br i t i sh fi r ms  i n 
r ecession are l i kel y t o close No r t hern I r i sh pl ants before t hey close Br i t i sh ones,   and 
t hat   t he expl anati on f or  t hi s does not   l i e i n t he peri pheral  l ocati on of  t he f orme r .   On e  
expl anati on f or  t he di f f erence i s t hat   l ocati ng pl ant  i n No r t hern I r eland i s r egarded as 
a r elati vel y  hi gh-ri sk vent ure t hat   a f i r m  i n r ecession can i l l   aff ord.
Sever al studi es have sought  t o quant i f y t he m agni t ude of such eff ects on
m anufacturi ng em pl oym ent .  These incl ude Row t horn ( 1981),   Canni ng et  al .   ( 1987) 
and Row t horn and W ayne (1988).  The esti ma t es of m anufacturi ng j ob l osses due to 
t he Troubl es range fr om  about  25, 000 t o about  45, 000.  Ho we v e r ,  a great deal of 5
cauti on shoul d be at t ached to t hese fi gures, wh i ch are based not  on econom et r i c 
analysi s but   on a com pari son of  curr ent  em ploym ent   grow t h i n No r t hern I r eland wi t h 
past  grow t h and/ or grow t h i n Bri t ain,  contr ol l i ng for changes in i ndust r i al
com posi t i on and publ i c em ploym ent  pol i cy. Thi s account i ng m et hod i nvol ves
calculat i ng t he confl i ct eff ect as a residual .  The s i ze of t he residual  coul d be
att r i but able t o a num ber  of  f actors – such as changes i n or  r egional   vari ati ons i n uni t  
l abour  costs –  t hat   are not   di r ectl y  r elated t o  t he  confl i ct.
Al t hough t he expl anati ons f or  a li nk bet w een t he Tr oubl es and m anufacturi ng 
em ploym ent  also imp l y a l i nk bet w een the Troubl es and m anufacturi ng i nvest me n t  
( unl ess t he product i on f unct i on i s very peculi ar) ,   t here are no studi es t hat   att em pt  t o 
quant i f y t he i nvest me n t  eff ect.  Ne v e r t hel ess, t here are several i nt ernat i onal  cross-
count r y st udi es that  fi nd a l i nk bet w een the degree of pol i t i cal inst abil i t y (vari ousl y 
m easured) and i nvest me n t  perf orm ance.  For exam ple, Al esina and Perot t i  (1993) 
expl ain cross-count r y i nvest me n t  vari ati ons by usi ng a "soci opol i t i cal i nst abil i t y
i ndex" const r uct ed by pri nci pal  com ponent s analysi s. The i mp o r t ant factors in t he 
i ndex are indi cators of t he absence of dem ocracy and the i nci dence of pol i t i cal
vi ol ence. Bot h K orm endi  and M egui r e (1985) and de H aan and Si erm ann (1996) 
di scover  simi l ar  r esult s.  Fedderke and Li u ( 1999)  and Fi eldi ng ( 1999)  appl y di f f erent 
t echni ques t o Sout h A fr i can ti me  s e r i es data to est i ma t e the si ze of the l i nk bet w een 
i nvest me n t   and  i ndi cators of  pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y.
A n addi t i onal  issue, di scussed by Col l i er (1999),  is that  pol i t i cal inst abil i t y 
and t he t hreat of civi l  wa r  ma y  a f f ect not  onl y aggregate invest me n t  but  also the 
com posi t i on of invest me n t .  In ri sky envi r onm ent s the dem and for nont r aded capit al 
goods (bui l di ngs and ot her constr uct i on w orks) m ay be part i cularl y l ow ,  because 
t hese  are not   geographi call y  m obi l e and  cannot   be  shipped  out   t o  anot her  area i f   t here 
i s a m ajor breakdow n i n ci vi l  society.  Som e t r aded capit al goods (m achinery and 
equi pm ent )  are m ore m obi l e, and t herefor e less of a ri sk. So an increase in pol i t i cal 
i nst abil i t y ( an i ncrease i n t he t hreat  of  civi l   wa r )   ma y   r educe const r uct i on i nvest me n t  
mo r e t han  m achinery  and  equi pm ent   i nvest me n t .
Mo s t   of  t hese r esult s on i nvest me n t   and pol i t i cal  i nst abil i t y are based on cross-
count r y  analysi s,  and  all   i ncl ude  count r i es t hat   have  experi enced greater  i nst abil i t y  t han 
No r t hern I r eland.   Ne v e r t hel ess,  t he underl yi ng r ati onal e f or  t he r esult s – t hat   i nst abil i t y 
shif t s product i vi t y and hence f actor  dem and dow nw ards – ought   also t o be ma n i f ested 
i n a t i me - s e r i es,  wh e n   t he m agni t ude of  i nst abil i t y vari es over  t i me .   I n t he next   secti on 6
we  wi l l  pursue thi s idea by const r uct i ng an econom et r i c m odel  that  incorporates such 
shif t s,  di sti ngui shing  bet w een t r aded capit al,   non-t r aded capit al,   and  em ploym ent .
3.   Mo d e l l i ng  Investme n t   and  Empl oym ent
3. 1  I nvestme n t ,   em ploym ent   and  pol i t i cal  conf l i ct  dat a  f or  Nor t hern  I reland
I n order to est i ma t e the i m pact of pol i t i cal confl i ct on m anufacturi ng i nvest me n t  and 
em ploym ent ,  we  wi l l  m ake use of sectoral panel  dat a on i nvest me n t  and em pl oym ent  
t hat   can be const r uct ed f r om  f i gures r eport ed i n t he Nor t hern I reland Annual   Abs t ract 
of   St at i sti cs.   Da t a f or  t ot al  em ploym ent   ( N) ,   m easured i n t housands,   can be const r uct ed 
f or 1965-95 for f our sectors: f ood and beverage processing,  engi neeri ng,  tr ansport  
equi pm ent   product i on and t exti l e product i on.   A  f i f t h category aggregates em ploym ent  
i n  ot her  m anufacturi ng  acti vi t i es.  The  sam e can be  done  f or  const r uct i on  i nvest me n t   ( I B)
and m achinery and equi pm ent  invest me nt  (I M) ,  m easured in t housands of pounds and 
defl ated by  t he  appropri ate defl ators i n Econom i c Trends.
2  The  separati on  of  i nvest me n t  
i nt o" t r aded"  and "nont r aded" com ponent s w il l  all ow  us t o t est the hypot hesi s that  
vi ol ent confl i ct can alt er t he com posi t i on of t he capit al stock.  A f i ner sectoral
di saggregati on  i s not   possibl e because of  t he  r eclassif i cati on  of  i ndust r i al  sectors duri ng 
t he sam ple peri od.   Fi gure 1 i l l ust r ates t he i nvest me n t   and em ploym ent   seri es.  I n som e 
of  t he sectors t he seri es exhi bi t   a ma r ked det ermi ni sti c t r end,   but   i n all   of  t hem  t here i s 
subst anti al  vari ati on  over  t he  sam ple peri od.
[F igure  1  here]
Ou r  aim i s to quant i f y t he ext ent to w hi ch thi s vari ati on i s due t o t he Troubl es by 
esti ma t i ng t he sensit i vi t y of  i nvest me n t   and em ploym ent   t o t i me - v a r yi ng i ndi cators of 
pol i t i cal confl i ct,  condi t i onal  on t i me - v a r yi ng econom i c factors. The s t r uct ure of the 
underl yi ng econom i c m odel   i s out l i ned i n secti on 3. 3 bel ow  and di scussed i n det ail   i n 
A ppendi x 1.  The econom i c ti me - s e r i es used are the average N ort hern Ir eland
m anufacturi ng wa g e   r ate f r om  t he Nor t hern I reland Annual   Abs t ract  of   St at i sti cs ( w) ,
t he const r uct i on i nvest me n t  and m achinery and equi pm ent  invest me n t  defl ators fr om  
Econom i c Trends ( vB and vM) ,
3  and t he f uel   pri ce i ndex f or  ma n u f acturi ng sectors f r om  
2  The  Nor t hern  I reland  Annual   Abs t ract  of   St at i sti cs and  Econom i c  Trends  are  bot h  HMSO  publ i cati ons.  
3Pr ovi nce-specif i c  capit al  goods  pri ces  are  not   r ecorded.7
Econom i c Trends (pf ) .  Al l  four of these are expressed relati ve t o t he m anufacturi ng 
out put  defl ator fr om  Econom i c Trends.  A f i f t h econom i c ti me  s e r i es used is the real 
i nt erest  r ate ( h) ,   m easured usi ng  as t he  UK  t r easury  bi l l   yi eld  r ate.
I n addi t i on t o t he econom i c vari ables we   wi l l   ma k e   use of  t wo   i ndi cators of  t he 
i nt ensit y of pol i t i cal confl i ct i n N ort hern Ir eland.  The f i r st i s the t ot al num ber of
f atali t i es each year as a result  of pol i t i call y m ot i vat ed acti vi t y ( F)  as report ed i n t he 
Sut t on Index of  De a t hs (ht t p: / / cain. ul st. ac.uk/ sutt on/ i ndex. ht ml ) .  Thi s fi gure incl udes 
civi l i an deaths,   securi t y  f orce deaths  and  param il i t ary  deaths.   We   assum e t hat   i nvest ors’ 
percepti on of the i nt ensit y of the confl i ct does not  depend on t he i denti t y of those 
ki l l ed.
4 The second i s the num ber of deaths per year as a fr acti on of the num ber of 
vi ol ent inci dent s ( G) .  The num ber of inci dent s is report ed in t he Nort hern I reland 
Annual   Abs t ract  of   St at i sti cs.  Thi s r ati o i ndi cates wh e t her  t he f atali t i es i n a gi ven year 
we r e the result  of m any sm al l  inci dent s or a few  large ones.  It  is possibl e that  a few  
l arge f atal  i nci dent s ( f or  exam ple,  bom bs t hat   ki l l   dozens of  peopl e)  have mo r e i m pact 
of  t he perceived m agni t ude of  t he confl i ct  t han m any sm all   ones,   whi ch mi ght   not   be 
vi ew ed that  di f f erentl y fr om  ot her vi ol ent deaths (f or exam ple, ones result i ng fr om  
apol i t i cal  cri mi nal   acti vi t y).
The  t wo   seri es are i l l ust r ated i n  Fi gure 2.   Bot h  t he  t ot al  num ber  of  f atali t i es and 
t he num ber  per  vi ol ent  i nci dent   are t aken t o  equal   zero  before 1969  ( wh e n   t hey  are f i r st 
r eport ed).   Fr om  1969 onw ards t he val ues of  bot h are posi t i ve.   Ther e i s nevert hel ess a 
great  deal  of  vari ati on  i n  t he  i ndi cators over  t he  peri od  1969-95,   r efl ecti ng  i ncreases and 
decreases in t he i nt ensit y of  confl i ct.  We  a n t i cipat e that  t hi s range of vari ati on,
i ncl udi ng t he peri od i mme d i ately before the st art  of t he Troubl es, wi l l  f acil i t ate
esti ma t es of  t he  extent  t o  wh i ch i ncrease i n  t he  i nt ensit y  of  confl i ct  l ead t o  r educt i ons  i n 
i nvest me n t   and  em ploym ent.
[F igure  2  here]
3. 2  Ti me - series  propert i es  of   t he  dat a
Be f ore proceeding t o est i ma t i on of t he i nvest me n t -em ploym ent  m odel ,  w e need to
ascert ain t he order  of  i nt egrati on of  each t i me - s e r i es l i sted i n Tabl e 1 bel ow .   Un i t   r oot  
t ests are r eport ed i n  Tabl e 2.   Sam pl e sizes f or  t he  t est  are not ed i n  t he  t able.  They  di f f er
4 Re gr essions usi ng di saggregated fatali t y dat a did not  yi eld st ati sti call y si gni f i cant,  int erpretable 
f i gures.8
Table 1: The Variables and Sectors Appearing in the Model
Variables Production Sectors
IM: log machinery and equipment investment F: food and beverages
IB: log construction investment E: engineering
N: log employment T: transp. equipment
w: log real manufacturing labour cost X: textiles
h: log real interest rate O: other
vM: log real price of machinery and equipment
vB: log real price of construction
pF: log real price of fuel
F: log total political fatalities + 1
G: log total violent political incidents + 1
Table 2: Unit Root Tests
2A: Panel Unit Root Tests (1965-95 for IM and IB; 1960-95 for E)
variable     t-bar statistic lags 5% c.v.
(IM) -3.50  0 -2.79
(IB) -3.32  1 -2.79
(N) -2.73  1 -2.78
2B: Univariate Unit Root Tests for Economic Variables (1960-95)
variable   p value lags trend
(w)    0.045  3   X 
(h)    0.004  0
(pF)    0.081  1 
2C: Univariate Unit Root Tests for Economic Variables (1965-95)
variable   p value lags trend
(vB)    0.019  1
(vM)    0.045  3   X
2D: Univariate Unit Root Tests for Political Variables (1969-1998)
variable   p value lags trend
(F)    0.006  0   X
(F-G)    0.000  0   X9
f r om  one vari able to anot her due t o di f f erences in dat a avail abil i t y.  W e have sect or-
specif i c observat i ons f or  t he t hree dependent   vari ables in our  m odel ,   so we   em ploy t he 
t -bar panel  uni t  root  test of Im e t  al .  (1998),  wh i ch all ow s for sectoral het erogenei t y.  
The  nul l   t hat   t he i nvest me n t   seri es are I ( 1)  can be r ejected against   t he alt ernat i ve t hat  
t hey are I( 0) around sect or-specif i c li near tr ends at  the 1%  l evel.  The t -stati sti c for 
em ploym ent   l i es almo s t   exactl y on t he 5%  confi dence i nt erval .   We   wi l l   t r eat  t he seri es 
as t r end-stati onary.
For  t he ot her vari ables (wh i ch do not  vary across sectors) we  e mp l oy t he 
standard ADF  t est.   B ecause i n such a sm all   sam ple ADF  cri t i cal  val ues are sensit i ve t o 
t he D G P assum ed under the nul l ,  we  s i mu l ate our ow n cri t i cal val ues.  The p - val ues
r eport ed are t ests of  t he  hypot hesi s t hat   r  =  0  i n  t he  r egression:




= Σ 1 bi   ￿  Dy t -i-  r￿y t - 1 +  ut     ( 1)
wh e r ey t   r epresents each of  t he vari ables i n Tabl e 2 and t he l ag order T i s det ermi ned 
by t he Schw art z C ri t eri on.  The di str i but i ons on w hi ch the p-values are based are 
const r uct ed on  10, 000  r epli cati ons  under  t he  nul l   DGP:




= Σ 1 bi   ￿  Dy t -i+  ut ( 1a)
The nul l  can be rejected at the 5%  l evel in al l  cases except that  of pf ,  wh e r e the 
signi f i cance level is about  8% .  We  w i l l  tr eat all  the vari ables as tr end-stati onary,
t hough t he t -values associated wi t h pf ,  in Secti on 3. 3 ought  to be t r eated w it h som e 
cauti on.
3. 3  The  esti ma t ed m odel
5
Us i ng t he dat a discussed above,  w e have observat i ons for fi ve sectors and (aft er 
t aking l ags)  29 years;  so we   have 145 observat i ons on sector  s i n year t.   The  m odel  
esti ma t ed i s a panel   VAR  f or  m achinery and equi pm ent   i nvest me n t   ( I M ) ,   const r uct i on
i nvest me n t  ( I B) and em pl oym ent  ( N) ,  condi t i onal  on (i )  econom i c cost vari ables 
( vector Z)  and (i i )  the pol i t i cal confl i ct vari ables (vector P)  di scussed in secti on 3. 1 
5  Al l   t he  result s report ed  i n  t hi s secti on  we r e   produced  usi ng  TSP  4. 4.10
and  l i sted i n  Tabl e 1  above.
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A ppendi x 1 show s how  t hi s representati on i s consi stent wi t h an aggregate m odel  
based on a profi t -m aximi sing representati ve fi r m.  Each param eter  i n t he m odel   i s t o 
be i nt erpreted as an average elasti cit y across the fi ve sectors. A ny cross-sector
het erogenei t y i n t he sl ope param eters in t he m odel  coul d pot enti all y i nduce
autocorr elati on i n t he r esidual s ut
s,   bi asing t he esti ma t es of  t hese averages.  I n such a 
case som e corr ecti on  w oul d  be  r equi r ed ( Pesar an and  Sm i t h,   1995;   Zhao  and  Pesar an, 
1998).   We   proceed on t he assum pti on of  no autocorr elati on;   t hi s assum pti on wi l l   be 
t ested in due course. a( L) ,b( L) and g( L) ar e lag operators. The t heoreti cal m odel  
i ndi cates t hat   elem ents of  a( L)shoul d  be  posi t i ve  and  elem ents of  b( L)   ( or  at  l east  t he 
corr espondi ng l ong-run coeff i cients)  shoul d be negat i ve.   We   anti cipat e t hat   elem ents 
of g( L)  wi l l  also be negat i ve:  an increase in t he t ot al num ber of pol i t i call y related 
f atali t i es w il l  reduce invest me n t  dem and and possi bl y al so em ploym ent ;  so too w i l l  
t he  num ber  of  f atali t i es per  vi ol ent  i nci dent .  
Al l  vari ables in t he m odel  have been de-t r ended.  Each dependent  vari able in 
t he X vector has been de-t r ended usi ng sect or-specif i c int ercepts and t r ends,  so w e 
have i n eff ect a w it hi n-groups est i ma t or.
7 No t e that  cont em poraneous val ues of the 
econom i c cost vari ables are excluded fr om  t he m odel ,  because no appropri ate
i nst r um ent s are avail able.
ut
s  i s a ( 3  x  1)  vector  of  r esidual s f or  each sector  s i n  each year  t .   Ther e i s no  a
pri ori  r estr i cti on  on  t he  covari ance ma t r i x  f or  t he  15  r esidual   t i me   seri es ( t hree f actors 
of  product i on,   f i ve sectors).   The  system  r epresented by equat i on ( 2)  i s esti ma t ed as a 
Seem ingl y  Un r elated Re gr ession  wi t h  15  equat i ons  and  param eter  equal i t y  r estr i cti ons 
6  Ne i t her  (i) nor  (ii ) vary  across  sectors.
7 Th e  DPD e s t i ma t or is not  defi ned for our sam ple, since  n + 1 < T.  Even wi t h a l arger nD P D
esti ma t es w oul d  be  l i kel y  t o  l ead t o  substanti al  over - f i t t i ng  wi t h  a T as l arge  as ours.  See Al varez and 
Ar ell ano  ( 1998).11
across t he f i ve sectors.  We   do how ever  assum e t hat   t here i s no autocorr elati on i n t he 
r esidual   t i me   seri es;  t ests of  t hi s hypot hesi s are r eport ed bel ow .  
Tabl e A 1 in A ppendi x 2 report s the est i ma t es and standard err ors of all  66 
param eters i n  t he  m odel   ( 22  f or  each of  t he  t hree dependent   vari ables i n  t he  X vector) .
B ecause there is a substanti al am ount  of autocorr elati on i n som e of the expl anatory
vari ables, t-rati os on m any i ndi vi dual  l ags are qui t e sm all ,  so the i ndi vi dual
coeff i cients are di f f i cult   t o i nt erpret.   For   t hi s r eason Tabl e 3 i n t he ma i n t ext  r eport s 
j ust  the est i ma t ed long-run el asit i cit i es on each explanatory vari able. Two t ypes of 
l ong-run  elasti cit y  are r eport ed.  For   each elem ent  of  X  and  each  elem ent  of  Z  or  P,   t he 
“coeff i cient 1” col um n l i sts the di rect long-run el asti cit y,  i. e.,  the l ong-run eff ect  of 
t he  r i ght -hand-side  vari able,  excludi ng  t he  f eedback bet w een t he  di f f erent  elem ents of 
X.  The “coeff i cient 2” col um n l i sts the l ong-run el asti cit i es w hen these feedback 
eff ects are incl uded.
8 I. e.,  t he “coeff i cient 2” col um n show s t he el em ents of t he
vectors ( I–a( 1))
-1b( 1)  and  ( I–a( 1))
-1g( 1).
Tabl e 4  l i sts som e descri pt i ve  and  di agnost i c stati sti cs f or  t he  system .  For   each 
of  t he  15  equat i ons  t he  t able i ndi cates t he  standard  devi ati on  of  t he  dependent   vari able 
alongsi de  t he  standard  err or  and R
2  of  t he  corr espondi ng  equat i on.   The  m odel   expl ains 
a large part  of t he sam pl e vari ati on of each dependent vari able, wi t h t he si ngl e 
excepti on  of  I B
F  ( const r uct i on  i nvest me n t   i n  f ood  and  beverages).   Tabl e 4  also r eport s 
LM  t ests for het eroskedast i cit y.  I n no case can the nul l  of hom oskedast i cit y be 
r ejected at  t he 5%  l evel.   Ther e are also t wo   LR  t ests f or  r esidual   autocorr elati on.   The 
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Thi s test assum es that  any residual  autocorr elati on i s com m on across sectors. The 
second does not  ma k e  t hi s assum pti on,  and t ests for t he si gni f i cance of t he 15 
elem ents of  q 
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8 Int eracti ons bet w een the t hree factors of product i on t hat  are insi gni f i cant at t he 10%  l evel are 
suppressed in calculati ng “coeff i cient 2”.  I. e.,  insi gni f i cant off - di agonal  elem ents of the [ Siai]   ma t r i x 
are  set  t o  zero.  The  suppressed  effects are  N  on  I M,N  on  I B,   and  I M  on  N.12
Table 3: Estimated Long-run Elasticities (See Table 1 for Variable Definitions)
variable  coeff. 1 std. err.  t ratio p value coeff. 2 std. err.  t ratio p value
IM elasticities
(w) -3.08787  1.19142 -2.59176  0.010 -3.42656  1.45606 -2.35331  0.019
(h)  0.07992  0.34204  0.23364  0.815  0.10798  0.41658  0.25921  0.795
(vN)  1.10845  1.20385  0.92076  0.357  1.25329  1.42857  0.87730  0.380
(vM)  1.68937  1.35376  1.24791  0.212  2.13102  1.60705  1.32605  0.185
(pF) -1.48473  0.41688 -3.56156  0.000 -1.89229  0.53006 -3.56995  0.000
(F) -0.57880  0.13908 -4.16155  0.000 -0.66771  0.16264 -4.10533  0.000
(F-G) -1.14686  0.27130 -4.22724  0.000 -1.29765  0.31582 -4.10886  0.000
IB elasticities
(w) -1.43310  2.56541 -0.55863  0.576 -2.53123  3.07197 -0.82398  0.410
(h)  0.21886  0.67352  0.32495  0.745  0.25792  0.79717  0.32354  0.746
(vB)  0.73344  2.05094  0.35761  0.721  1.14046  2.44103  0.46720  0.640
(vM)  3.19840  2.29824  1.39167  0.164  3.94050  2.81412  1.40026  0.161
(pF) -2.99368  1.16858 -2.56181  0.010 -3.65659  1.36469 -2.67942  0.007
(F) -0.50802  0.19975 -2.54326  0.011 -0.72787  0.25532 -2.85087  0.004
(F-G) -0.76766  0.35585 -2.15722  0.031 -1.18929  0.47388 -2.50967  0.012
N elasticities
(w) -0.96319  0.25990 -3.70599  0.000 -0.99487  0.30531 -3.25857  0.001
(h) -0.15340  0.06426 -2.38717  0.017 -0.14251  0.07552 -1.88699  0.059
(vB)  0.25136  0.20962  1.19909  0.230  0.27244  0.23082  1.18028  0.238
(vM)  0.13952  0.27917  0.49978  0.617  0.25074  0.30745  0.81556  0.415
(pF) -0.61236  0.09279 -6.59953  0.000 -0.70675  0.11760 -6.00981  0.000
(F) -0.07318  0.02866 -2.55380  0.011 -0.08982  0.02854 -3.14745  0.002
(F-G) -0.22296  0.05335 -4.17938  0.000 -0.24584  0.05178 -4.74775  0.00013
Table 4: Regression Descriptive Statistics
(See Table 1 for Variable Definitions)
heteroske-
equation std. dev.      std. err.          R2 dasticity*
(IM
F) 0.263126       0.208297       0.356151      0.771
(IM
E) 0.258415       0.235957       0.230917      0.119
(IM
T) 0.668007       0.553077       0.303610      0.127
(IM
X) 0.524700       0.404973       0.418934      0.488
(IM
O) 0.258745       0.204206       0.384757      0.812
(IB
F) 0.353896       0.412525       0.000398      0.241
(IB
E) 0.675393       0.577586       0.252214      0.267
(IB
T) 1.283010       1.041940       0.351954      0.145
(IB
X) 0.841283       0.628581       0.427303      0.274
(IB
O) 0.347083       0.340438       0.189943      0.152
(NF) 0.047922       0.035819       0.448328      0.883
(NE) 0.109848       0.057200       0.721875      0.602
(NT) 0.090274       0.066372       0.461784      0.058
(NX) 0.127943       0.047916       0.868951      0.922
(NO) 0.099214       0.055032       0.717054      0.621
* p-value for an LM test of residual heteroskedasticity
LR Residual Autocorrelation Test 1: F(15,199) = 0.29085      0.9958
LR Residual Autocorrelation Test 2: F(03,211) = 1.67130      0.1742
Table 5: Impulse Responses of Dependent Variables to Shocks to 
Elements of the P Vector (See Table 1 for Variable Definitions)
(i) standard deviation impulse to F
period (IM)( I B)   (N)
t = 0 -0.388 -0.244 -0.025
t = 1 -0.351 -0.449 -0.065
t = 2 -0.131 -0.293 -0.030
(ii) standard deviation impulse to F-G
period (IM)   (IB)   (N)
t = 0 -0.390 -0.273 -0.047
t = 1 -0.060 -0.046 -0.040
t = 2 -0.321 -0.505 -0.04614
Ne i t her  t est  stati sti c i s signi f i cant  at  t he  10%   l evel.
9
3. 4  Res ul t s of   Es t i ma t i on
The s t ati sti call y si gni f i cant coeff i cients in Tabl e 3 are consistent wi t h econom i c 
t heory  and  wi t h  our  pri ors about   t he  i m pact  of  pol i t i cal  confl i ct  on  econom i c acti vi t y:
  ( i )   Hi gher  r eal  l abour  costs r educe bot h em ploym ent   and i nvest me n t ;   i n f act,   t he 
esti ma t ed equi l i bri um  i m pact  of  an i ncrease i n t he wa g e   ( coeff i cient  2)  i s greater 
f or invest me n t  than i t  is for em ploym ent .  A 1 % i ncrease in t he w age i s esti ma t ed 
t o reduce invest me n t  in m achinery and equi pm ent  by about  3. 4% ,  const r uct i on
i nvest me n t   by  about   2. 5%   and  em ploym ent   by  about   1% .  
( i i )   Hi gher  f uel   pri ces also r educe em ploym ent   and i nvest me n t .   A  1%  i ncrease i n 
f uel  pri ces is esti ma t ed to reduce invest me n t  i n m achinery and equi pm ent  by
about  1. 9% ,  const r uct i on i nvest me n t  by about  3. 7%  and em pl oym ent  by about  
0. 7% .
( i i i )   Hi gher  r eal  i nt erest  r ates r educe em ploym ent ,   a 1%  i ncrease i n i nt erest  r ates 
l eading  t o  a 0. 1%   r educt i on.   Ho we v e r ,   t he  esti ma t ed eff ect  of  r eal  i nt erest  changes 
on i nvest me n t  is insi gni f i cantl y di f f erent fr om  zero.  (I n fact poi nt  esti ma t es are 
posi t i ve,   but   several  t i me s   sm all er  t han  t he  associated standard  err or. )
( i v)  Ca pi t al  goods  pri ces are not   f ound  t o  have  a stati sti call y  signi f i cant  i m pact  on 
eit her  i nvest me n t   or  em ploym ent .
Condi t i onal  on t hese econom i c vari ables, the eff ect of changes in t he i nt ensit y of 
pol i t i cal  confl i ct  on  bot h  i nvest me n t   and  em ploym ent   are l arge  and  signi f i cant:
( i )  An  i ncrease in t he t ot al num ber of f atali t i es r esult i ng f r om  t he confl i ct  r educes 
i nvest me n t  in bot h t ypes of capit al and em pl oym ent .  A 1 % i ncrease in fatali t i es 
r educes bot h  i nvest me n t   i n  ma c h i nery  and  equipm ent   and  constr uct i on  i nvest me n t  
by  about   0. 7% .   The  corr espondi ng  r educti on  i n  em ployment   i s about   0. 1% .
( i i )  A 1 % i ncrease in t he num ber of f atali t i es per vi ol ent i nci dent  r educes
i nvest me n t   i n m achinery and equi pm ent   by about   1. 3% .   The  corr espondi ng f i gure 
f or  const r uct i on  i nvest me n t   i s 1. 2% .   For   em ploym ent   i t   i s 0. 2% .
Ther e is no evi dence that  t he i nt ensit y of confl i ct has a di f f erenti al i m pact on
i nvest me n t   i n di f f erent  t ypes of  capit al.   Ther e are no signi f i cant  di f f erences i n eit her 
t he di r ect  eff ects ( coeff i cient  1)  or  t he equi l i bri um  eff ects ( coeff i cient  2).   Ther e i s no 
9  Ther e  i s a  caveat  t o  t hese  stati sti cs.  The  report ed  F- t ests are  based  on  OLS  regressions  of  t he  system s 
r epresented  by  equat i ons  ( 3)  and  ( 4).   The  val ue  of  t he  F- stati sti cs  does  vary  wi t h  t he  esti ma t or  used.15
support   f r om  t he  No r t hern  I r eland  dat a f or  t he  hypot hesi s t hat   const r uct i on  i nvest me n t  
i s especiall y sensit i ve t o m easure of  t he i nt ensit y of  confl i ct.   Ho we v e r ,   t he esti ma t ed 
eff ects on i nvest me n t   are several  t i me s   greater  t han t hose on em ploym ent .   Ba s i ng our 
calculati ons on t he coeff i cient  2 colum n,   a 1%  i ncrease i n t ot al  f atali t i es r educes t he 
capit al -labour rati o by about  0. 6% ;  a 1%  increase in t he num ber of fatali t i es per 
vi ol ent i nci dent  reduces the capit al -labour rati o by about  1% .  A s a consequence,  
l abour product i vi t y and w ages are li kel y t o fall .  Wi t h m ore fr equent l y report ed data 
on  wa g e s   i t   mi ght   be  possibl e t o  esti ma t e t he  m agni t ude  of  t hi s eff ect.
The  sam ple peri od we   are usi ng cont ains very f ew  years i n wh i ch t he num ber 
of  f atali t i es i s anyw here near  zero,   so i t   w oul d be i nappropri ate t o use t he r esult s here 
t o hypot hesi ze about   t he equi l i bri um  i m pact  of  a com plete cessati on of  vi ol ence.  The 
m odel   coul d  we l l   be  non-l i near  at  very  sm all   val ues  of  F.   Mo r eover,   a subst anti al  part  
of  t he i n-sam ple di f f erence bet w een hi gh- and l ow-vi ol ence years coul d be due t o t he 
del aying of invest me n t  duri ng peri ods of hi gh vi ol ence and corr espondi ngl y greater 
i nvest me n t  duri ng l ul l s; t hi s w oul d cert ainl y be t he case in a D i xi t -Pindyck
i nt erpretati on  of  t he  r esult s.
Ho we v e r ,w e  can say som ethi ng  about   t he  size t he  pol i t i cal  vi ol ence eff ects by 
calculati ng i m pul se response profi l es for each of the factors of product i on.  Im pul se 
r esponses are r eport ed i n Tabl e 5.   The  f i gures i ndi cate t he percentage change i n each 
f actor  of  product i on i n r esponse t o a one-peri od shock t o eit her  ( i )   t ot al  f atali t i es ( F)
or (i i )  fatali t i es per vi ol ent inci dent  ( F- G) .  The s i ze of the shocks i s one sam ple 
standard devi ati on (1. 443 for F;  0. 727 for F-G) .  The short -term r educt i ons i n
i nvest me n t   i n r esponse t o  t hese  shocks  are we l l   over  25% ;   t he  em ploym ent   eff ects are 
sm all er,   at  around 5% .   A  str i ki ng f eature of  Tabl e 5 ( at  l east  f or  em ploym ent ,  N,   and 
equi pm ent   i nvest me n t ,  I M)  is that  the responses t o i ncreases in t he pol i t i cal vi ol ence 
i ndi cators are i mme d i ate,  i n  t he  sense t hat   t he  peak of  r esponse  profi l e i s at  t   =  0  or  t   = 
1.   The  f ul l   eff ect  of  an i ncrease or  r educt i on i n vi ol ence i s apparent  wi t hi n a year.   I t  
com es as no surpri se t hat   t hi s i s not   t r ue of  const r uct i on i nvest me n t ,   ( I B)   wh i ch has a 
l onger  gest ati on  peri od.   For   I B  t he  profi l e peaks at  t   =  1  f or  F  and  at  t   =  2  f or  F- G.
The esti ma t es in Tabl es 3 and 5 al so indi cate w hy t here is no obvi ous
simi l ari t y  bet w een t he  t i me - p r ofi l es of  i nvest me n t   and  em ploym ent   ( Fi gure 1)  and  t he 
t i m e-profil e of t ot al fatali t i es (Fi gure 2).  Ther e is a substanti al fall  in t he fatali t y 
f i gures aft er 1975:  the average annual  num ber of fatali t i es for 1970-75 i s 246;  the 
average num ber for 1976-95 i s 53.   Ther e i s no corr espondi ng r i se i n i nvest me n t   and 16
em ploym ent   aft er t hi s peri od.  On e  r eason for thi s is that  the benefi t s of low er tot al 
f atali t i es are off set by an i ncrease in fatali t i es per vi ol ent inci dent ,  also il l ust r ated in 
Fi gure 2.   The  average val ue  of  F- G  r ose  f r om   –2. 75  over  1970-75  t o  –2. 17  over  1976-
95.   Al t hough  i n  t erms   of  t ot al  deaths  t he  i nt ensit y  of  t he  Tr oubl es subsi ded  aft er  1975,  
t he  seri ousness  of  i ndi vi dual   vi ol ent  i nci dent s cont i nued  t o  i ncrease.
4.   S u mma r y   and  Co nc l usi on
Panel  dat a esti ma t es of t he det ermi nant s of i nvest me n t  and em pl oym ent  i n t he
No r t hern Ir eland m anufacturi ng sect or indi cate that  vari ati ons i n t he i nt ensit y of the 
pol i t i cal  confl i ct  have  a l arge  and  signi f i cant  i m pact  on  econom i c acti vi t y.   The  i m pact 
on i nvest me n t   i s greater  t han t he i m pact  on em ploym ent ,   as one w oul d expect  i f   t he 
sunk-cost elem ent of i nvest me n t  decisions i s greater t han t hat  of em ploym ent
decisions.  Ho we v e r ,  t here is no signi f i cant di f f erence betw een the i m pact on
const r uct i on  i nvest me n t   and  t hat   on  equi pm ent   i nvest me n t .
I nvest me n t  and em pl oym ent  in any gi ven year ar e aff ected bot h by t he t ot al 
num ber  of  casualt i es i n  t he  confl i ct  and  by  t he  average size of  vi ol ent  i nci dent s i n  t hat  
year.   I n ot her  wo r ds,   a f ew  l arge i nci dent s have mo r e i m pact  t han m any sm all   ones.  
Fr om  an econom i c poi nt   of  vi ew ,  a singl e i nci dent   l i ke Bl oody Sunday or  t he O m agh 
bom bi ng causes mo r e dam age t han m any sm all   vi ol ent  i nci dent s l eading t o t he sam e 
num ber  of  f atali t i es.  Changes i n confl i ct  i nt ensit y f r om  one year  t o t he next   have an 
i mme d i ate eff ect on i nvest me n t  and em pl oym ent .  Ou r  r esult s indi cate that  t he
i ncrease i n  m anufacturi ng  acti vi t y  r esult i ng  f r om   a perm anent   cessati on  of  all   vi ol ence 
i s li kel y t o be subst anti al and t o happen very qui ckly.  For  reasons di scussed above,  
how ever,   i t   w oul d be i mp r udent   t o use our  esti ma t es t o calculate a categori cal  f i gure 
f or  t he  peace di vi dend.
To  t he  extent  t hat   t he  r educt i ons  i n  i nvest me n t   and  em ploym ent   are a r esponse 
t o uni nsurable ri sks associated w it h upt urns i n t he i nt ensit y of pol i t i cal confl i ct,  the 
r esult s here indi cate an econom i c rati onal e for the subst anti al subsi di es enjoyed by 
No r t hern Ir i sh indust r y.  The f act that  invest me n t  is far mo r e greatl y aff ected than 
em ploym ent  suggest s that  invest me n t  subsi di es have a m uch m ore robust  econom i c 
j ust i f i cati on  t han  em ploym ent   subsi di es.17
Appendi x  1
I n  t hi s appendi x  we   deri ve  t he  m odel   used  i n  Secti on  3. 3;   t hi s i s an extension  of  t he  m odel  
descri bed by Ram a (1993).  Ther e are two  t ypes of capit al invest me n t  in t he m odel :  non-
r esident i al const r uct i on (B)  and m achinery /  equi pm ent  (M) .  The opt i ma l  level   f or  each 
t ype of  capit al  i s t hat   wh i ch ma x i mi ses t he grow t h i n t he val ue of  t he r epresentati ve f i r m,  
P.P  i s gi ven  by:
P  =  [P t ￿Qt-   W t ￿Nt-   Pt
F￿Yt ] +  {P t +1￿Qt +1-   E[ W t +1] ￿Nt +1-   E[ Pt +1
F] ￿Yt +1  }/[1 +  r t ]               ( A1 )




















t - 1￿[1 +  r t - 1]}
wh e r eQti s t he f i r m' s out put   at t,Pt   t he pri ce of  t hi s out put ,  W t   wa g e s ,  N t   em ploym ent ,  P t
F
f uel   pri ces,  Yt   use  of  f uel ,   r t   t he  nom i nal   i nt erest  r ate,  k
i
t   t he  stock  of  t he  i
t h  t ype  of  capit al,   I
i
t
gross i nvest me n t   i n  t hi s t ype  of  capit al  ( pl anned  one  peri od  ahead),   V
i
t   t he  pri ce of  t hi s t ype 
of  capit al  good  and E[   ] an expectati ons  operator.   The  f i r m  chooses  k
i
t +1,N t +1,Yt +1  and Q t +1.
The  f i r st  t wo   bracketed t erms   r epresent  t he present  di scount ed val ue of  present  and f ut ure 
operati ng profi t s. The t hi r d t erm r epresents the cost  of acqui r i ng new  capi t al goods.  The 
f i nal   t wo   t erms   r epresent  di scount ed capit al  gai ns f r om  changes i n t he val ue of  t he f i r m' s 
capit al  stock  over  t he  t wo   peri ods.
Ne i t her t he fi r st nor t he l ast t erm i n equat i on (A1 )  i s dependent  on curr ent
i nvest me n t ,  and w i l l  not  aff ect the m axi mi sati on probl em . De f i ni ng t hese t erms  a s  z t ,   we  
can wr i t e:
P  =  z t   +  {P t +1￿Qt +1-   E[ W t +1] ￿Nt +1-   E[ Pt +1




t                     ( A2 )









The  stock of  t he i
t h type of capit al is related to gross invest me n t  by t he fol l ow i ng l aw  of 
mo t i on:
k
i
t +1  =  [k
i
t   +  I
i
t ]/[1 +  d]                    ( A3 )
d  i s t he  r ate of  capit al  depreciati on.   Subst i t ut i ng  equat i on  ( A3 )   i nt o  equat i on  ( A2 ) :18




t +1-   E[ W t +1] ￿Nt +1-   E[ Pt +1
F] ￿M t +1  }/[1 +  r t ]                     ( A4 )
wh e r eC
i
t   i s t he  user  cost  of  capit al  net   of  a capit al  gai ns  t erm:
C
i
t   =  [ r t   +  d  +  r t ￿d] ￿V
i
t-   [V
i
t +1-   V
i
t ]  ( A5 )
I n order to deri ve a t r actable solut i on for the opt i ma l  capit al stock,  we  wi l l  assum e that  
out put  is a log-l i near  f unct i on of  em ploym ent   and t he f i r m' s stock of  each t ype of  capit al.  
We  i nt r oduce adjust me n t  costs by al l ow i ng out put  t o depend negat i vel y on t he rate of 
grow t h of capit al (product i vi t y i s low er w hen new  capit al is being i nst all ed).  It  is possibl e 
t hat   t he sam e t ype of  costs coul d also appl y t o l abour,   so t hat   wo r kers are l ess product i ve 
duri ng  a peri od  of  expansi on  of  t he  wo r kforce,  and out put   i s l ow er  duri ng  t he  expansi on:



























1  >  a  >  f  >  0,   1  >  b  >  w  >  0,   1  >  g   >  y  >  0,   1  >  z  >  0,   q  >  0,
a  +  b  +  g   +  z -f-y -w  £  1
The par am eter restr i cti ons em body neocl assical assum pti ons.  We  w i l l  also all ow  dem and 
f or  t he f i r m' s out put   t o depend negat i vel y on i t s r elati ve pri ce.  Subst i t ut i ng equat i on ( A6 )  
i nt o  equat i on  ( A4 )   we   have:
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t +1 -   E[ W t +1] ￿Nt +1-   E[ Pt +1
F] ￿M t +1  }/[1 +  r t ]  




t +1,N t +1  and Yt +1yi elds t he f ol l ow i ng solut i ons f or 
k
i
t +1,   expressed i n  l ogari t hm s:
l n(k
B
t +1)   =  l n( a -f)-   l n(E[ c
B
t +1])  +  {[q  +  f￿l n(k
B
t )   +  w￿l n(Nt )   +  y￿l n(k
B
t ) ] ￿s                          (Α8)
-   l n(E[ wt +1])￿[ b-w]   -   l n(E[ c
M




t +1)   =  l n(g-y)-   l n(E[ c
M
t +1])  +  {[q  +  f￿l n(k
B
t )   +  w￿  l n(Nt )   +  y￿l n(k
B
t ) ] ￿s                    (Α9)
-   l n(E[ wt +1])￿[ b-w]  -   l n(E[ c
B
t +1])￿[ a -f]  -   l n(E[ pt +1
F])￿z}/[1 -s]19
wh e r es  =  [ a  +  b  +  g +  z  -  f  -  w  -  y] , and l ow er  case l ett ers r epresent  r eal  f actor  costs: w t
=  W t / Pt ,   pt
F  =  Pt
F/ Pt   and c
i
t   =  C 
i
t / Pt .A ssum ing  t hat   em ploym ent   decisions  are pl anned  one 
peri od i n advance,  actual  em ploym ent  i n peri od t +1 wi l l  be equal  to t hat  pl anned i n 
peri od t:
l n(Nt +1)   =  l n(b  -w)-   l n(E[ wt +1])  +  {[q  +  f￿l n(k
B
t )   +  w￿l n(Nt )   +  y￿l n(k
B
t ) ] ￿s                        (Α10)
-   l n(E[ c
B
t +1])￿[ a -f]   -   l n(E[ c
M
t +1])￿[ g-y]-   l n(E[ pt +1
F])￿z}/[1 - s]
I n  ot her  wo r ds,   t he  opt i ma l   capit al  stock  and  em ploym ent   l evels are l og-l i near  f unct i ons  of 
t he  r eal  user  cost  of  each t ype  of  capit al,   t he  r eal  wa g e   r ate,  t he  r eal  f uel   pri ce,  t he  existi ng 
stock  of  each t ype  of  capit al  and  t he  existi ng  l evel  of  em ploym ent .   Equat i ons  ( A8 - A 10)  are 
of  t he  general  f orm:
l n(k
B
t +1)   =  a 1–l n(E[ c
B
t +1])  +  a4￿l n(k
B
t )   +  a5￿l n(Nt )   +  a6￿l n(k
M
t )                                                                 (Α8a)
-   a8  ?l n(E[ wt +1])  -   a9  ?l n(E[ c
M




t +1)   =  a2–l n(E[ c
M
t +1])  +  a4￿l n(k
B
t )   +  a5￿l n(Nt )   +  a6￿l n(k
M
t )                                                               (Α9a)
-   a7  ?l n(E[ c
B
t +1]) -  a8  ?l n(E[ wt +1])  -   a10  ?l n(E[ p t +1
F])
l n(Nt +1)   =  a3–l n(E[ wt +1])  +  a4￿l n(k
B
t )   +  a5￿l n(Nt )   +  a6￿l n(k
M
t )                                                               (Α10a)
-   a7  ?l n(E[ c
B
t +1])  -   a9  ?l n(E[ c
M
t +1]) -  a10  ?l n(E[ pt +1
F])
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t t l p p
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t )   =  p￿[ a1–l n(E[ c
B
t ]) -  a8?l n(E[ wt ])  -   a9?l n(E[ c
M
t ]) -  a10?l n(E[ pt
F])]                                            (Α14)
        +  [(1  -p) ￿l1  +  a4] ￿l n(I
B
t - 1)   +  a 6￿l n(I
M
t - 1)   +  π⋅a5⋅l n(Nt - 1)  




t 2   ( lt  +  a4￿lt - 1) ￿l n(I
B
t - t)   +  a6￿lt - 1￿l n(I
M
t - t) ]
l n(I
M
t )   =  p￿[ a2–l n(E[ c
M
t ]) -  a7  ?l n(E[ c
B
t ]) -  a8?l n(E[ wt ]) -   a10?l n(E[ p t
F])]                                      (Α15)
        +  [(1  -p) ￿l1  +  a6] ￿l n(I
M
t - 1)   +  a4￿l n(I
B
t - 1)   +  π⋅a5⋅l n(Nt - 1)  




t 2   ( lt  +  a6￿lt - 1) ￿l n(I
M
t - t)   +  a4￿lt - 1￿l n(I
B
t - t) ]
l n(Nt )   =  p￿[ a3–l n(E[ wt ]) -  a7  ?l n(E[ c
B
t ]) -  a9?l n(E[ c
M
t ]) -  a10?l n(E[ pt
F])]                                          (Α16)
        +  a5￿l n(Nt - 1)   +  [a 4/ p] ￿[ln(I
B




t 2 lt￿l n(I
B
t - t) ]
        +  [a 6/ p] ￿[ln(I
M




t 2 lt￿l n(I
M
t - t) ]
Wi t h  Ra t i onal   Expectati ons,   t he  di f f erences bet w een E[ x t ]a ndx twi l l   be  enti r ely  r andom ,   so 
we   can wr i t e:
l n(I
B
t )   =  p￿[ a1–l n(c
B
t )-   a8?l n(wt )   -   a9?l n(c
M
t )-   a10?l n(pt
F) ]                                                                                  (Α14a)
        +  [(1  -p) ￿l1  +  a4] ￿l n(I
B
t - 1)   +  a 6￿l n(I
M
t - 1)   +  π⋅a5⋅l n(Nt - 1)  




t 2   ( lt  +  a4￿lt - 1) ￿l n(I
B
t - t)   +  a6￿lt - 1￿l n(I
M





t )   =  p￿[ a2–l n(c
M
t )-   a7  ?l n(c
B
t )-   a8?l n(wt )  -   a10?l n(p t
F) ]                                                                            (Α15a)
        +  [(1  -p) ￿l1  +  a6] ￿l n(I
M
t - 1)   +  a4￿l n(I
B
t - 1)   +  π⋅a5⋅l n(Nt - 1)  




t 2   ( lt  +  a6￿lt - 1) ￿l n(I
M
t - t)   +  a4￿lt - 1￿l n(I
B
t - t) ] +  u
M
t
l n(Nt )   =  p￿[ a3–l n(wt )-   a7  ?l n(c
B
t )-   a9?l n(c
M
t )-   a10?l n(pt
F) ]                                                                              (Α16a)
    +  a5￿l n(Nt - 1)   +  [a 4/ p] ￿[ln(I
B




t 2 lt￿l n(I
B
t - t) ]
        +  [a 6/ p] ￿[ln(I
M




t 2 lt￿l n(I
M
t - t) ] +  u
N
t
wh e r e t he  u
i
t   are r andom   vari ables.  Wi t h  Ad a p t i ve  Expectati ons,   how ever,   l ags of  t he  f actor 
pri ce terms  wi l l  also appear in t he system . No t e that  l n(c
i
t )  has t wo  l i nearl y separable 
com ponent s: a real int erest rate term ( adjust ed for capit al depreciati on) and a real capit al 
goods  pri ce t erm:21
l n(c
i
t )   =  l n(v
i
t )   +  l n(h t )( A 17)
wh e r el n( v
  i
t )   =  l n(V
i
t / Pt )     and ln(ht )   =  l n(r t - 1  +  d  +  r t - 1￿d -   [v
i
t-   v
i
t - 1]/  v
i
t - 1)
Si nce l n(wt ) ,l n(c
B
t ) ,l n(c
M
t )   and ln(pt
F)ar e pot enti all y endogenous t o f actor  dem and,   i t   wi l l  
not  be possi bl e (i n t he absence of appropri ate inst r um ent s) t o i ncl ude t hem  i n an
econom et r i c m odel   of  f actor  dem and.   I f   we   we r e t o  assum e Ra t i onal   Expectati ons,   t hen  l ags 
of  f actor  pri ces coul d  be  used  as i nst r um ent s.  Thi s assum pti on  ma y   be  t oo  r estr i cti ve,   so we  
i nst ead adopt  a reduced-f orm v e r sion of the system  that  is agnost i c about  expectati ons 
f orma t i on.   Cont em poraneous val ues of  t he f actor  pri ces are r eplaced by l ags up t o order T,
and  t he  t wo   com ponent s of  l n(c
i
t )may  have  di f f erent  coeff i cients:
l n(I
B




t 1 b1t￿l n(v
B
t - t)-   b2t?l n(wt - t)   -   b3t?l n(v
M
t - t)-   b 4t?l n(pt - t
F)–  b5t?l n(h t - t) ]                     (Α14b)
        +  [(1  -p) ￿l1  +  a4]￿l n(I
B
t - 1)   +  a6￿l n(I
M
t - 1) +  π⋅a5⋅l n(Nt - 1)  




t 2   ( l t  +  a4￿lt- 1) ￿l n(I
B
t - t)   +  a6￿lt- 1￿l n(I
M









t 1 f 1t￿l n(v
B
t - t)-  f 2t?l n(wt - t)   -   f 3t?l n(v
M
t - t)-  f 4t?l n(pt - t
F)–  f 5t?l n(ht - t) ]    (Α15b)
        +  [(1  -p) ￿l1  +  a 6] ￿l n(I
M
t - 1)   +  a4￿l n(I
B
t - 1)   + π⋅a5⋅l n(Nt - 1)  




t 2   ( lt  +  a6￿lt- 1) ￿l n(I
M
t - t)   +  a4￿lt- 1￿l n(I
B
t - t) ]   +  u
M
t




t 1 z 1t￿l n(v
B
t - t)-   z 2t?l n(wt - t)   -   z 3t?l n(v
M
t - t)-   z 4t?l n(pt - t
F)–  z 5t?l n(ht - t) ]  (Α16b)
        +  a 5￿l n(Nt - 1)   +  [a4/ p] ￿[ln(I
B




t 2 lt￿l n(I
B
t - t) ]
        +  [ a6/ p] ￿[ln(I
M




t 2 lt￿l n(I
M
t - t) ]   +  u
N
t
I f   t he l ag order  on all   r i ght - hand-side vari ables i s r estr i cted t o t wo ,   t hen t he system  can be 
r epresented by equat i on (2) in Secti on 3. 3.  That  the est i ma t ed u
i
tare not  autocorr elated 
suggest s that  thi s restr i cti on represents a reasonable approxi ma t i on of equat i ons (A 14b-
A 16b).22
Appendix 2: Table A1: SUR Estimates of the Regression Coefficients (with White Corrected Standard Errors)
variable ln(IM) co. std. err.  t ratio ln(IB) co. std. err.   t ratio ln(Es) co. std. err.  t ratio
(IM)-1  0.252422 0.071830  3.514150  0.410715 0.112779  3.641780 -0.003310 0.010197 -0.32428
(IM)-2  0.009020 0.076936  0.117232  0.015720 0.118231  0.132956 -0.016178 0.011408 -1.41806
(IB)-1  0.069025 0.037647  1.833460  0.141794 0.075450  1.879300  0.006600 0.005650  1.16855
(IB)-2  0.062584 0.036856  1.698060  0.108589 0.073342  1.480590  0.019628 0.005760  3.40838
(N)-1 -0.343494 0.350983 -0.978664 -0.506409 0.511462 -0.990120  0.820944 0.067865 12.09670
(N)-2 -0.261180 0.338528 -0.771518  0.082688 0.506292  0.163321 -0.225996 0.061319 -3.68557
(w)-1  1.206460 0.851008  1.417690  3.771700 1.705780  2.211130 -0.052446 0.110840 -0.47317
(w)-2 -3.487040 0.847383 -4.115070 -4.845980 1.720880 -2.815990 -0.337695 0.108609 -3.10927
(h)-1  0.077916 0.170721  0.456392  0.103461 0.349541  0.295992 -0.010176 0.021262 -0.47860
(h)-2 -0.018894 0.187546 -0.100743  0.060599 0.379573  0.159650 -0.051961 0.024052 -2.16035
(vB)-1 -0.164746 0.747143 -0.220501 -1.726360 1.524560 -1.132360 -0.111657 0.094346 -1.18349
(vB)-2  0.983404 0.506540  1.941410  2.276160 1.029820  2.210250  0.213469 0.066077  3.23063
(vM)-1 -0.452309 1.159660 -0.390037  1.702990 2.313370  0.736152  0.312127 0.148072  2.10794
(vM)-2  1.700000 1.169770  1.453290  0.694580 2.400560  0.289340 -0.255613 0.147111 -1.73755
(pF)-1 -2.103910 0.452987 -4.644540 -3.765520 0.921514 -4.086240 -0.387375 0.056324 -6.87764
(pF)-2  1.007350 0.492435  2.045660  1.521410 1.000560  1.520560  0.139338 0.063761  2.18531
(F) -0.268731 0.060848 -4.416440 -0.169173 0.122648 -1.379340 -0.017381 7.87E-03 -2.20906
(F)-1 -0.164030 0.062521 -2.623600 -0.175540 0.128401 -1.367130 -0.030227 8.04E-03 -3.75797
(F)-2  0.005280 0.041275  0.127972 -0.036108 0.082706 -0.436584  0.017967 5.38E-03  3.34209
(F-G) -0.536356 0.122876 -4.365020 -0.374912 0.251361 -1.491530 -0.063670 0.015384 -4.13866
(F-G)-1  0.077676 0.078422  0.990482  0.211249 0.160316  1.317700 -2.86E-03 0.010128 -0.28223
(F-G)-2 -0.388347 0.091616 -4.238850 -0.411784 0.184504 -2.231850 -0.023782 0.011644 -2.0425223
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Fi gure 1(a):   R eal  M anufacturi ng  I nvest me n t   ( i n  Logari t hm s)
























Fi gure 1(b):   Empl oym ent   ( i n  Logari t hm s)26









Fi gure 2(a):   l og  ( 1  +  Tot al  Fat ali t i es i n  Vi ol ent  I nci dent s),   F







Fi gure 2(b):   l og(1  +  Tot al  Fat ali t i es i n  Vi ol ent  I nci dent s)  –  l og(1  +  Vi ol ent  I nci dent s),   F- G